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ture, the Government should be able to utilize whatever evidence is
available in bringing suit under section 7 of the Clayton Act." Prac-
tical as well as policy considerations, however, prevent a section 7 de-
fendant from enjoying a similar latitude. This in itself does not mean
that the Government enjoys a "heads-I-win, tails-you-lose" advantage
over its adversaries, for often the restrictions placed on the defendant's
use of post-acquisition evidence will be completely justifiable, for, rea-
sons not applicable to similar use by a prosecuting authority. Where
courts have automatically applied restrictive shibboleths to the de-
fendant's use of such evidence, however, this criticism has had some
validity. Hopefully the Supreme Court in General Dynamics has abdi-
cated such a rigid approach for the future, in favor of a more discrim-
inating analysis.
RAYMOND M. BERNSTEIN
Constitutional Law-Gilmore v. City of Montgomery: Is There
More to Equal Protection Than State Action?
Ratification of the fourteenth amendment in 1868 guaranteed that
"[n]o State shall . . .deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws."1 Fifteen years later the United States
Supreme Court in the Civil Rights Cases "embedded in our constitu-
tional law' 2 the principle "that the action inhibited by the . . . [equal
protection clause] is only such action as may fairly be said to be that
of the States. That amendment erects no shield against merely pri-
vate conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful."13  Thus a viola-
tion of the fourteenth amendment necessitates a finding of two factors.4
First, it requires a finding of state action.5 Secondly, there must be
a finding of a substantive denial of equal protection, a denial that must
54. Contra, Neal, supra note 27.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
2. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948), citing Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S.
3 (1883).
3. Id.
4. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
5. Note, Private Clubs: Freedom of Association Overlooked in Effort to Guar-
antee Equal Protection, 23 SYRAcusE L. Rnv. 905, 910 (1972); see Bell v. Maryland,
378 U.S. 226 (1964).
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be "wrongful" in the sense that no countervailing interest exists -that
makes it permissible.'
The complex variety of possible circumstances and changing
social, moral, and political values have caused the courts to develop
equal protection principles on a case by case basis.7 Although it has
emphasized state action, the Court has neglected the development of
the substantive requirement.8 By posing the technical requirement of
state action as the sole criterion for finding the existence or nonexist-
ence of constitutionally prohibited discrimination,9 the Court has been
able to ignore the hard decisions involved in defining "wrongful dis-
crimination."'10 In Gilmore v. Montgomery," the Burger Court has in-
dicated that it will continue this trend.
In 1958 the petitioners asked for an injunction to desegregate the
public parks of the city of Montgomery. The federal district court
granted the injunction,' 2 and the court of appeals affirmed, modifying
the order so that the district court retained jurisdiction.'" In spite of
this order the city continued to allow segregated private school and
non-school groups to use the facilities for events such as football and
baseball games. Therefore, on a motion for supplemental relief, the
district court prohibited the city from allowing access to public recrea-
tional facilities to either school or non-school segregated groups.'
The court of appeals modified this order to allow use by segregated
private groups and nonexclusive use by segregated school groups.' 5
The Supreme Court affirmed the prohibition on exclusive use by
segregated school groups, but reversed the court of appeals' allowance
of use by segregated private groups and nonexclusive use by segregated
school groups. The Court based these reversals on the insufficiency
6. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
7. See Kotch v. Board of River Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947). In Burton
v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961), the Court stated that
"[o]nly by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of
the State in private conduct be attributed its true significance."
8. Silard, A Constitutional Forecast: Demise of the "State Action" Limit on the
Equal Protection Guarantee, 66 COLum. L. Rv. 855 (1966).
9. Comment, A Statement Against State Action, 37 S. CAL. L. REv. 463, 467
(1964).
10. Note, Equal Protection-State Liquor License to Private Club Held Not Sig-
nificant State Action, 47 TUL. L. REv. 906, 912 (1973).
11. 417 U.S. 556 (1974).
12. Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 176 F. Supp. 776 (M.D. Ala. 1959).
13. City of Montgomery v. Gilmore, 277 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1960).
14. Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 337 F. Supp. 22 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
15. Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 473 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1973).
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of the record and remanded to the lower court.16  In remanding for
determination of these issues, the Court laid down guidelines for use
by the lower court in analyzing the alleged denial of equal protection.
In finding the necessary state action in the exclusive use by school
groups, Gilmore relied on several factors established by previous de-
cisions as indicative of state action in school desegregation cases. In
Cooper v. Aaron'7 the Court had held that "[s]tate support of segre-
gated schools through any arrangement, management, funds, or prop-
erty cannot be squared with the amendment's command -that no state
shall deny. . . equal protection of the laws."' 8 Later cases restricted
Cooper by holding that generalized services such as electricity, water,
and police and fire protection are outside of state action.' 9
Gilmore "fleshed out" this skeleton by stating three factors2 ° that,
if found to be the effect of city policy, demonstrated state action: (1)
enhanced attractiveness, (2) capital savings, and (3) concessions
generating revenue. For example, the use of city football stadiums al-
lowed the segregated schools to avoid building facilities of their own.
This significant capital saving could be used to fill other needs thus
making segregated schools more attractive and thwarting -the imple-
mentation of a unified desegregated public school system.
The Court suggested that these factors are also relevant in finding
state action in nonexclusive use by segregated schools. 2' Use of the
facilities in common with others, however, would not provide as much
benefit to the private schools. Fewer facilities would be available, and
opportunities to generate revenue from concessions would be limited.
Therefore, the Court concluded -that the potentially lessened benefit
16. 417 U.S. at 570, 575.
17. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). In this case in which the school board attempted to post-
pone a desegregation plan, the Court came out strongly against any state action which
would impede desegregation.
18. Id. at 19.
19. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 465 (1973); see, e.g., Granes v. Walton
County Bd. of Educ., 465 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1972); McNeal v. Tate County School
Dist., 460 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1971); Poindexter v. Louisiana Fin. Ass'n Comm'n, 275
F. Supp. 833 (E.D. La. 1967), affd per curiam, 389 U.S. 571 (1968); Lee v. Macon
County Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458 (M.D. Ala. 1967); Griffin v. State Bd. of Educ.,
239 F. Supp. 560 (E.D. Va. 1965), modified, 296 F. Supp. 1178 (E.D. Va. 1969).
20. 417 U.S. at 569. The court of appeals found the "capital savings" to be of
"more practical significance," 473 F.2d at 837, while the district court saw the third fac-
tor, "concessions generating revenue," as "more significant." 337 F. Supp. at 25.
21. The Court stated that "such assistance, although proffered in common with
fully desegregated groups, might so directly impede the progress of court-ordered school
desegregation... that it would be appropriate to fashion equitable relief 'adjusting and
reconciling public and private needs.'" 417 U.S. at 571.
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to the schools would merit approaching the situation on the facts of
each case to determine the extent of the impairment of school desegre-
gation orders.
22
To find state action in use of public facilities by private segregated
groups, Gilmore examined the extent of state involvement .2  The
Court had used this criterion before in Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority24 in which the discrimination occurred in a private restaurant
located on public property. Burton held that benefits mutually con-
ferred on the owner and the State, in combination with public owner-
ship of the property, significantly involved the State and therefore con-
stituted state action.25 In Gilmore the Court emphasized that not all
state involvement constituted state action. It classified municipal rec-
reational facilities such as parks, playgrounds and zoos with the tradi-
tional state "generalized services" like electricity and water. 20  Conse-
quently the Court required a stronger showing of state involvement and
suggested that the rationing of equipment or facilities to private segre-
gated groups by a fixed schedule rather than by allowing use on a first-
come first-serve basis might demonstrate the required involvement. "7
In all of these "use" situations, -the Court adequately discussed the
guidelines for determining state action.
To satisfy the substantive requirement of wrongful discrimination
in use of public facilities by segregated private schools, the Court relied
on Brown v. Board of Education,28 which had banned discrimination
in public schools. Gilmore refused to allow circumvention of a pre-
vious desegregation order for the Montgomery school system29 by al-
lowing the State to promote segregation indirectly in a private school."
The Court considered the implementation of a unitary school system
to be so important that it overrode countervailing interests.,"
22. Id.
23. Id. at 572.
24. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
25. In Burton the benefits were primarily financial. The Parking Authority would
receive revenue from customers parking in the garage while eating at the restaurant and
the restaurant received business from people who came primarily to use the garage.
26. 417 U.S. at 574; see Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 465 (1973); Evans
v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 302 (1966).
27. 417 U.S. at 574.
28. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
29. Carr v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 232 F. Supp. 705 (M.D. Ala. 1964);
253 F. Supp. 306 (M.D. Ala. 1966); 289 F. Supp. 647 (M.D. Ala. 1968), af'd as modi-
lied, 400 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1968), rev'd sub nom. United States v. Montgomery County
Dd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225 (1969).




The requirement of a finding of wrongful discrimination received
only cursory treatment in the Court's analysis of park use by segregated
private groups. In a "word of caution,"32 the Court suggested that any
action restricting access to public facilities would be closely examined
when it involved freedom of association. While the Court recognized
that freedom of association may conflict with freedom from discrimina-
tion,33 it failed to offer any guidelines -to balance these competing con-
stitutional rights. By failing to confront this conflict, the Court con-
tinued a trend toward sole reliance on the requirement of state action
as the basis for equal protection decisions.34
Initially, wrongful discrimination served as the primary basis for
finding a violation of equal protection. State action was a secondary
limitation. 35 In Shelley v. Kraemer,36 a case often noted for expanding
the concept of state action, -the Court realized the necessity of finding
wrongful discrimination. It satisfied that requirement by reaffirming
the principle that "freedom from discrimination by the states in the en-
joyment of property rights was among the basic objectives sought to
be effectuated by the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment.""1  In
recent years, however, the Court has confused the two requirements of
the fourteenth amendment to the extent that frequently the sole ques-
tion posed is whether state action is present.38 Burton studiously
avoided the issue of whether wrongful discrimination occurred. In
Reitman v. Mulkey 9 the Court examined a state constitutional amend-
ment that guaranteed the right of an individual to sell his property to
anyone he chose. This amendment was held to have set out the "law-
ful" right to discriminate and thereby encouraged discrimination. The
Court found this to constitute state action and gave little consideration
to whether the discrimination was "wrongful."
Gilmore was not the first time the Supreme Court has been faced
32. Id. at 575.
33. Id.
34. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S.
745 (1966); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Au-
thority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
35. Silard, supra note 8; Comment, 37 S. CA. L. REv., supra note 9.
36. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
37. Id. at 20. This principle was firmly established in the landmark case of Bu-
chanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
38. This problem troubled Justices Black, White, and Harlan in their dissent in Bell
v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 326-35 (1963).
39. 387 U.S. 369 (1967). But see Note, Neutral Statute Held Not To Be a Source
of Discriminatory State Action: The Emasculation of Reitman v. Mulkey, 3 RUTGERs-
CAMDEN L.J. 155 (1971).
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with the conflict between wrongful discrimination and freedom of
association. In Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,40 a black who was
denied service at the dining room of a private club solely because of
his race, filed for injunctive relief. The Court decided the case on the
grounds that the lodge's state liquor license did not supply the neces-
sary state action to find a denial of equal protection. It did not openly
confront the issue of whether the discrimination was wrongful in view
of the countervailing right of freedom of association. 41 Justice Douglas
in a dissent joined by Justice Marshall and quoted by the majority in
Gilmore" acknowledged the valued right of freedom of association.
"The associational rights which our system honors permit all white, all
black, all brown, and all yellow clubs to be formed. . . . Government
may not tell a man or woman who his or her associates must be. The
individual can be as selective as he desires."' 43  The Court, however,
ignored the opportunity to define the limits of these rights by basing
its decision on state action.44
In Gilmore the Court has again passed over the opportunity to
consider this issue. A finding of state action is a valid and necessary
determination in deciding whether discrimination falls under the consti-
tutional prohibition. Equally important, however, is the determination
that discrimination exists and that there are no countervailing constitu-
tional rights which justify that discrimination.
Language in Gilmore stating that "the very exercise of freedom
to associate by some may serve to infringe -that freedom for others,""
indicates that the Court realized -that these freedoms conflict.40 While
the Court speaks decisively to the issue of state action, the opinion
should have revealed that a balancing 4r of these conflicting rights took
place and should also have enunciated the reasons for the decision on
that basis. Only if the Court addresses both requirements of the equal
protection clause can the lower courts and attorneys be certain on the
40. 407 U.S. 163 (1972). For a discussion of freedom of association see Healy
v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
41. Note, 23 SYRACUSE L. REV., supra note 5; Note, 47 TuL. L. REv., supra note
10.
42. 417 U.S. at 575.
43. 407 U.S. at 179-80.
44. Note, 47 Tut. L. REv., supra note 10, at 912.
45. 417 U.S. at 575.
46. See Silard, supra note 8, at 870.
47. For an example of a previous use of a balancing test by the Court in an equal
protection issue see Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
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substantive issue that the conflict of competing constitutional rights has
been faced and resolved.
To admit that discrimination may not be wrongful in some circum-
stances is not a retreat from principles of equality, for the same retreat
can be, and arguably is, being made4' under the colors of state action.
Rather it is a move toward honesty; a move for a realistic look at the
basic issues that must in fact underlie the Court's decisions.
CRAIG Jr. TILLERY
Constitutional Law-Tax Exemption for Widows Upheld over
Sex Discrimination Challenge
In recent years the fourteenth amendment's equal protection
clause and the fifth amendment's due process clause' have been used
by women to challenge statutes that allegedly discriminated against fe-
males on the basis of sex. A few of the cases have reached the United
States Supreme Court, and several statutes have been found unconsti-
tutional although no definitive test or rule has emerged from the de-
cisions.2 In Kahn v. Shevin3 the Court faced a different type of sex
discrimination case. Instead of a female plaintiff claiming that she was
being denied equal protection, a man brought the suit, charging that
a Florida tax exemption discriminated against males. The Court, in
48. Note, Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board's Licensing at a Private Club Is Not
Sufficient State Action Under Equal Protection Clause, 77 DIcK. L. Rnv. 157 (1972);
Note, Racial Discrimination by Private Club Held Not State Action Despite State Issued
Liquor License and Accompanying Regulations, 41 FODH&M L. REv. 695 (1973); Note,
Moose Lodge v. Irvis: The Undecided Decision, 8 NEw ENGLAND L. REv. 251 (1973);
Note, State Liquor License Granted To a Private Club Adhering To Discriminatory
Guest Practice Does Not Constitute "State Action" in Violation of the Equal Protection
Clause, 2 TEXAs S.U.L. Rnv. 338 (1973); Note, Licensing and Regulation of Private
Clubs by State Liquor Control Board Does Not Constitute State Action, 4 TExAs TncH.
L. REV. 211 (1972).
1. The due process clause in the fifth amendment has been employed by the Su-
preme Court as an equal protection clause applicable to the federal government; e.g.,
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
2. See text accompanying notes 25-30 infra.
3. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
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